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be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is 
there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors 
determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article 
attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.  
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CBA: Abbreviation of cost-benefit analysis: a method, which uses abatement costs and benefits 
from abatement, in order to determine optimal (global) abatement levels as well as an optimal 
allocation of abatement burdens. 
 
CEA: Abbreviation of cost-efficiency analysis: a method, which uses abatement costs, in order to 
determine an optimal allocation of abatement burdens for a given (global) abatement level. 
 
C-Models: Abbreviation of compliance models. Coalition models that focus on compliance of 
signatories with the obligations of international environmental agreements. 
 
Coalition Theory: Field in game theory that analysis the formation of coalitions. In the context of 
international environmental agreements coalition theory investigates which countries will accede to 
a treaty and whether they will comply with their treaty obligations. 
 
Free Riding: Act of non-participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) or non-
compliance with treaty obligations agreed in an IEA.    3
Game Theory: Mathematical method that analyzes interactions of agents based on assumptions of 
the behavior of agents and predicting the outcome of those interactions. In the context of 
international environmental agreements, game theory investigates under which conditions 
cooperation between countries will be successful. 
 
Effectiveness: Measures are called effective if they have a positive impact compared to some 
benchmark. The impact may be measured in ecological or welfare terms. 
 
Efficiency: Also called cost-efficiency. Policy measures are called efficient if the achieve a target 
at minimal costs. 
 
P-Models: Abbreviation of participation models. Coalition models that focus on participation in 
international environmental agreements. 
 
   4
1. Introduction  
 
International pollution problems have become increasingly important issues on the agenda of 
politicians, economists and natural scientists. Prominent examples are the acidification of lakes and 
soils through sulfur and nitrogen oxides, the depletion of the ozone layer through 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and the rise of atmospheric temperature through so called greenhouse 
gases. A distinctive characteristic of international pollution problems is that pollution does not 
remain within national boundaries. Consequently, an optimal policy response would require that 
nations do not pursue a national but an international environmental policy where countries consider 
not only environmental damages at home but also those abroad caused by their emissions. This, 
however, requires coordination and cooperation among nations that is usually formalized in 
international environmental agreements (IEAs) of which those mentioned in the text are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, a first best solution to international pollution problems is 
straightforward and implies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). In a first step all countries 
emitting and suffering from a pollutant have to be identified. In a second step information about 
abatement costs and benefits from abatement in the form of reduced damages have to be gathered. 
In a third step the optimal global abatement level and those of individual countries are determined 
by maximizing the difference between aggregate benefits and aggregate costs from abatement.  
 
For the globally or socially optimal solution some general characteristics hold. 1) The  higher 
aggregate benefits are compared to aggregate costs from global abatement, the higher is the 
globally optimal abatement level and vice versa. 2) Those countries with lower costs per unit of 
abatement (marginal abatement costs) should reduce pollution more than those with higher cost 
per unit of abatement. 3)  If some countries face similar unit costs of abatement, then those 
countries that cause a higher environmental damage should abate more than countries which cause 
relatively lower environmental damage. 
 
The  first feature guarantees that the choice of the global abatement level is based on rational 
principles. It recognizes that abatement reduces environmental damages but is also associated with 
costs in the form of forgone production and consumption of goods. In particular, it recognizes the 
following relations. On the one hand, costs increase more than proportionally with increasing levels 
of abatement. That is, at high levels of abatement, an additional unit of abatement involves higher 
unit costs (marginal abatement costs) than at lower levels since more sophisticated abatement 
devices have to be implemented. On the other hand, benefits increase less than proportionally with 
increasing abatement levels. That is, at high levels of abatement, an additional unit of abatement 
generates less additional benefits (marginal benefits) since environmental quality is already high. 
 
The first feature implies for instance that global abatement should be higher for CFC-pollutants 
than for greenhouse gases. Both pollutants cause severe damages and therefore aggregate benefits 
as well as marginal benefits from abatement are high. However, abatement costs as well as marginal 
abatement costs of CFCs are relatively low compared to greenhouse gases since for CFCs cheap 
substitutes have been developed over recent years, whereas this option is currently not available for 
fossil fuels, the use of which causes greenhouse gases.  
 
The second feature guarantees cost-efficiency. That is, abatement levels should be allocated to the 
various countries in such a way that the globally optimal abatement level is achieved at least cost.   5
This feature is particularly important if an ambitious abatement level is implemented in order to 
keep costs at moderate and acceptable levels. It implies for instance in the case of greenhouse gases 
that developing countries and countries in transition should shoulder a greater abatement burden 
than industrialized countries since - on average - they face lower unit abatement costs. The reason is 
that in most industrialized countries the level of environmental protection is already high and hence 
additional abatement efforts are associated with high abatement costs. In contrast, in countries like 
China and Russia, energy efficiency is very low. That is, emissions per gross national product are 
very high and hence these countries can conduct abatement at low unit costs.  
 
The third feature guarantees ecological efficiency. It does not apply to global pollutants but only to 
regional pollutants where the distributional pattern of the deposition of emissions matters for global 
damages. For instance, Great Britain should reduce more sulfur emissions than other countries since 
most of its emissions are transported to Nordic countries with sensitive ecological systems where 
emissions cause much environmental damage. In contrast, global pollutants, like CFCs and 
greenhouse gases, mix uniformly in the atmosphere. Therefore, irrespective of which country 
reduces emissions, one unit of emission reduction generates the same global benefit. 
 
The first and the third feature stress the first-best-solution character of the globally optimal 
solution: not only information about abatement costs but also about benefits from abatement is 
required to determine optimal abatement levels. If information about benefits from abatement is not 
available or uncertain, then a more pragmatic and second best solution to international pollution 
problems is to conduct a cost-efficiency analysis (CEA). In a first step only those countries emitting 
a pollutant have to be identified. In a second step only information on abatement costs has to be 
gathered. In a third step optimal individual abatement levels are determined by minimizing 
aggregate costs from abatement for a given global abatement target. For such a pragmatic solution 
the second characteristic from above applies, except that the global abatement target is set by a 
decision maker and may not be globally optimal. For instance, in the case of greenhouse gases the 
Kyoto Protocol targets at an emission reduction of 5.2 percent based on 1990 emission levels to be 
achieved in the period 2008-2012. Though this target has been set based on scientific evidence, it is 
certainly not globally optimal in the sense of a CBA but mainly reflects a political compromise 
between the signatories to this agreement. Since all countries emit greenhouse gases, a cost-
efficient solution would also require - as in the case of a CBA - that all countries contribute to the 
achievement of this target and that - as mentioned above - developing countries and countries in 
transition contribute more to cost-efficient cooperation. 
 
From a practical point of view, however, things are less straightforward. Already a casual analysis 
of international environmental agreements reveals that implemented solutions are usually neither 
first nor second best solutions, and can be regarded at best as third best solutions. This will be 
illustrated with some empirical evidence that I structure according to four features. 
 
Participation 
In most IEAs the number of parties falls short of the total number of countries involved in the 
externality problem. Here, "involved countries" means not only all countries in the full sense of a 
CBA (all countries that emit and suffer from a pollutant) but also just in the sense of CEA (all 
countries that emit a pollutant). This observation is particularly true for those IEAs with explicit 
and ambitious abatement targets. For instance, almost all countries emit and suffer from the global 
pollutants CFCs and greenhouse gases, which thus amounts to roughly 200 countries. However, 
only 38 industrialized countries have originally accepted greenhouse gas emission ceilings under   6
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the US, as a major polluter, withdrew from the Protocol in spring 
2001. Also only 26 countries signed the Montreal Protocol in 1987, regulating CFC emissions, 
though participation has risen substantially over recent years to presently 181 members. However, 
fewer countries participate in the amendment protocols, which followed the Montreal Protocol and 
which target at more ambitious abatement targets. For instance, the London Protocol signed in 1990 
counts 153 participants, the Copenhagen Protocol signed in 1992 counts 128 participants, the Mont-
real Protocol signed in 1997 comprises 63 participants and the Beijing Protocol has been signed by 
11 countries in 1999, though this last amendment protocol has not yet come into force since it has 
not been ratified by enough countries so far. Moreover, though sulfur is a major air pollutant that is 
emitted by and from which most countries suffer in Western and Eastern Europe and North 
America, the Helsinki Protocol signed in 1985 counts currently only 22 parties of which 16 are EU-
countries. In contrast, participation in the framework conventions preceding the above-mentioned 
protocols, which are basically only declarations of concern about an environmental problem and 
declarations of intentions that pollution should be reduced without specific abatement obligations, 
is very high. For instance, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) preceding the 
Kyoto Protocol counts 186 parties, the Vienna Convention preceding the Montreal Protocol and its 
successor protocols counts 182 parties and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Pollution (LRTAP) preceding the Helsinki Protocol counts 48 parties. 
 
Compliance 
There is ample evidence that even if countries participate in an IEA, they do not always comply 
with their abatement obligations. This applies not only to IEAs regulating pollutants but applies to 
IEAs in general and has been confirmed by many empirical studies on compliance conducted by 
political scientists. For instance, no less than over 300 infractions of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) signed in 1973 in 
Washington D.C. have been counted per year. Also, all important parties breached the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), signed in 1946 in Washington D.C. Japan, 
Norway and the USSR are particularly smart since they catch whales under the guise of "scientific 
whaling" that is legal under the whaling convention. As a result, Norway hunted five times as many 
whales in 1997 as in 1992. IEAs regulating pollutants are no exception. For instance, even though 
important CFCs are banned under the Montreal Protocol since 1991, customs officers throughout 
the world regularly intercept deliveries of these substances. 
 
Effectiveness 
The few empirical studies measuring the effectiveness of IEAs suggest that implemented abatement 
levels are close to those which countries were to implement anyway if they would pursue their self-
interest non-cooperatively (national environmental policy). This has been confirmed for instance for 
the above mentioned Montreal Protocol signed in 1987, the Helsinki Protocol signed in 1985 and 
the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 but also for the Oslo Protocol that has been signed in 1994, 
which is the successor protocol to the Helsinki Protocol on sulfur reduction. That is, agreed 
abatement targets, though they may seem large in absolute terms, are small when compared to those 
required by a globally optimal solution.  
 
Efficiency 
As long as countries have different unit abatement costs, cost-efficiency requires that countries 
reduce emissions to a different extent. In reality, however, uniform solutions are part of many IEAs. 
Under many "old" IEAs uniform emission reduction quotas have been negotiated, which imply that 
countries have to reduce their emissions by the same percentage compared to some base year. The   7
list of examples is long and includes the Helsinki Protocol, which suggested a 30 percent reduction 
of sulfur emissions from 1980 levels by 1993. Moreover, the "Protocol Concerning the Control of 
Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes" signed in Sofia in 1988 called on 
countries to uniformly freeze their emissions at 1987 levels by 1995 and the "Protocol Concerning 
the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Fluxes" signed in Geneva in 
1991 required parties to reduce 1988 emissions by 30 percent by 1999. Only "modern" IEAs apply 
the "principle of different responsibilities", including the Oslo, Kyoto and Montreal Protocol. 
However, even though the Montreal Protocol allows developing countries to be exempted from 
certain regulations, to claim a transition period until full compliance is required and to draw on 
support from various financial mechanisms to meet their targets, it calls on uniform reductions of 
various CFC-pollutants in the different amendments. Also in the original draft of the Kyoto 
Protocol emission reduction of the major global players are very similar (USA: 7 percent, Japan and 
Canada: 6 percent and EU: 8 percent) despite unit abatement costs that differ widely.  
 
In the light of the empirical evidence three questions arise:  
 
1)  Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions?  
2)  Which factors determine this difference?  
3)  Which measures can help to narrow this difference?  
 
The answer depends by and large on the field and method of the analysis. In this paper I survey the 
answers of the environmental economics literature using coalition theory - a field of game theory - 
to analyze the formation and stability of IEAs. Game theory is a mathematical method analyzing 
and predicting the outcome of the interaction of agents. Coalition theory focuses on the possibilities 
of forming stable agreements between agents in order to pursue a common goal. In the game 
theoretical literature on international pollution problems agents means countries or governments, a 
coalition is a group of cooperating countries that aims at reducing emissions beyond the non-
cooperative status quo and hence coalition theory is a method for analyzing the incentive structure 
of countries to participate in an IEA and to comply with the terms of the agreement. So far, this 
literature abstracted from the political decision process within countries for simplicity and assumed 
that governments aim at maximizing the welfare of their citizens (see section 5 for a discussion of 
this assumption). 
 
In what follows I provide in section 2 an informal sketch of the structure of coalition models and a 
preliminary answer to the first question raised above. Subsequently, I discuss important factors 
which influence the success of cooperation in section 3 and outline elements of treaty design that 
can hamper or encourage cooperation in section 4.  
 
2. Coalition Models 
 
2.1 Problems of Modeling Coalition Formation  
 
Analyzing coalition formation is a complex business and involves three steps. First, the decision 
about participation or membership has to be modeled. The features of this decision are called the 
rules of coalition formation. Important rules are for instance the sequence of coalition formation 
(simultaneous versus sequential process), the number of coalitions that can form (single versus 
multiple coalitions), the nature of membership (open versus exclusive membership; that is, free 
versus restricted accession to a coalition) and the degree of consensus needed to form a coalition. 
(For details see section 4.) Second, the decision about the design of an agreement within a coalition   8
has to be modeled. Important ingredients are the implemented global abatement level within the 
coalition, the allocation of the abatement burdens on the coalition members, the level and the 
donors and recipients of possible transfer payments, the type, level and the allocation of the 
obligations of sanctions in case of non-compliance. Third, what stability of a coalition means has to 
be defined and stable coalition structures have to be determined.  
 
The first and second step concerns the actual process of coalition formation. Ideally, this process 
should be modeled as an endogenous process that follows from the behavior of countries. However, 
in practice, it turned out that this approach is too ambitious. Therefore, all models make some 
simplifying assumption, which are plausible but exogenous, and solve for the remaining 
endogenous variables. Moreover, the various models capture some but not all aspects of coalition 
formation and concentrate on certain aspects. The third step relates to the prediction of the outcome 
of coalition formation and depends on the notion of an equilibrium concept. Though the various 
models differ in many aspects, they all share one fundamental assumption: there is no third party 
like an international agency that can implement cooperation and hence the parties themselves must 
enforce treaties. Thus, in contrast to the political science and juridical literature, the game 
theoretical literature considers international law as non-binding since the International Court of Jus-
tice can only open a trial if the accused party agrees. Consequently, a preliminary answer to the first 
question raised above is that due to the lack of a central authority stability of first or second best 
solutions are difficult to obtain. Generally, stability of an IEA depends on three conditions.  
 
1) Profitability: Each participant in an IEA must receive more than in the non-cooperative status 
quo.  
2) Participation: No participant has an incentive to leave an IEA to become non-signatory. 
3) Compliance: No participant has an incentive to violate the terms of the agreement. 
 
The first condition is a basic prerequisite for successful cooperation and may be seen as a nessary 
though not sufficient condition for participation and compliance. The second and third condition 
capture the phenomenon that even if an IEA is profitable to all participants, countries face two 
types of free-rider incentives. The first type is the incentive to remain a non-signatory, or in the 
more general context, to belong to a coalition that contributes less to abatement than other 
coalitions. The second type is the incentive to join an IEA but to violate its terms. In both cases, 
free-riders save abatement costs but benefit from abatement efforts of neighboring countries. Again, 
it turned out be too complex for game theoretists to construct a model that simultaneously captures 
all three stability conditions. Though all models capture profitability in some way, they focus either 
on participation or compliance. Therefore, coalition models can be divided into two groups: 
participation models (P-models) and compliance models (C-models)  
 
From the discussion it is evident that there is no "universal model", which captures all aspects of 
coalition formation and stability. Consequently, there is also no universal answer to the three 
questions raised above and conclusions have to be drawn with caution. Nevertheless, in order to 
provide a concise summary of the main findings of the game theoretical literature on coalition 
formation, I avoid qualifications in the discussion in section 3 and 4 and refer the interested reader 
for details to the bibliography at the end of this article. However, in order to understand how the 
results in section 3 and 4 are derived and on which fundamental assumptions they are based, a brief 
sketch of the structure and features of coalition models is subsequently provided. 
   9




P-models have a few things in common. First, they assume (except one model; see the 
bibliography) that if a coalition forms, coalition members maximize the aggregate welfare to their 
coalition but ignore the welfare of outsiders. This has two implications. a) There is cooperation 
among coalition members but some rivalry across coalitions. b) The global abatement level of the 
coalition is optimal for the coalition in the sense of a CBA and the allocation of abatement burdens 
among its members is cost-efficient, that is, it is optimal for the coalition in the sense of a CBA or 
CEA. Thus, if a P-model predicts that a coalition structure different from the grand coalition (the 
coalition comprising all countries) is stable, suboptimality stems not from a suboptimal design of a 
treaty but only from the fact that not all countries participate in an IEA. As a tendency, the larger a 
coalition, the higher will be the implemented abatement target. Thus, if single countries join a 
coalition (a cooperation of at least two countries) or if two coalitions merge, the global abatement 
level increases. By the same token, if countries leave a coalition or if coalitions break apart, global 
abatement will decrease. Thus, there are two benchmarks. At one end, if no country forms a 
coalition, that is countries remain singletons, they pursue their own national environmental policy, 
which is the non-cooperative status quo. At the other end, if all countries are in one coalition (grand 
coalition), they pursue an optimal international environmental policy by implementing globally 
optimal abatement levels. Hence, any coalition structure in between these two benchmarks is 
superior to the non-cooperative status quo but inferior to the globally optimal solution. The term 
coalition structure simply refers to the allocation of countries into groups. For instance, in the case 
of three countries there are five possible coalition structures: ({1},{2},{3}); ({1,2},{3}); 
({1,3},{2}); ({1},{2,3}) and ({1,2,3}). The first coalition structure is the singleton coalition 
structure, representing the non-cooperative status quo; the second, third and fourth coalition 
structure comprise coalitions of two countries, representing "partially cooperative solutions"; and 
the last coalition structure is the grand coalition, representing the globally optimal or "fully coop-
erative solution". 
 
Second, P-models assume that once countries have decided on their membership they will comply 
with their abatement and transfer obligations. Therefore, the free-rider problems of real IEAs (non-
compliance) are underestimated. Third, a particular coalition structure (state 1) is called stable if 
countries have no incentive to move to another coalition structure (states 2, 3,...). Since countries 





C-models also have features in common. First, they put less emphasis on the actual process of 
coalition formation but focus on whether and how a treaty can be enforced. Stability is checked for 
the grand coalition implementing globally optimal abatement levels but also for suboptimal designs 
of treaties, comprising smaller coalitions, less ambitious abatement targets and an inefficient 
allocation of abatement burdens. Second, they assume that a group of countries agrees on the terms 
of an IEA in stage 1, which have to be enforced in subsequent stages 2, 3, .... by their members. 
Since IEAs typically do not specify the end of a treaty, C-models assume an infinite time horizon. A 
treaty is called stable, that is, all coalition members comply with their obligations, if the discounted 
payoff from cooperation is larger than the discounted payoff from taking a free-ride and 
subsequently being punished. Consequently, a necessary condition for stability is profitability since   10
otherwise it is never possible to deter non-compliance via sanctions. Third, C-models emphasize the 
role of sanctions for stability. On the one hand, the harsher sanctions are, the easier it is to sustain 
cooperation. On the other hand, sanctions have to be credible to deter non-compliance. Credibility 
means two things in particular. a) Sanctions must provide a treaty violator with an incentive to go 
along with the punishment so that all parties can return to "normal terms" as quickly as possible. 
Consequently, sanctions must be moderate so that the punisher finds it more attractive to "cooper-
ate" during his punishment than to leave the treaty. b) Sanctions must be designed such that those 
countries conducting the punishment suffer no disadvantage. That is, there should be no room for a 
treaty violator to offer his potential punishers a deal to treat bygones as bygones, promising to 
resume cooperation. Such kind of renegotiation would imply that the threat of punishment would 
loose its credibility in the first place and stability of an IEA would suffer. Again, only moderate 
sanctions will satisfy this condition. Sanctions satisfying condition a and b are called renegotiation-
proof. 
 
3. Factors Influencing the Success of Cooperation 
 
3.1 Degree of Asymmetry 
 
Though cooperation raises global welfare, individual countries may be worse off than in the status 
quo. That is, cooperation is not always profitable for all countries. This may be true for optimal 
solutions in the sense of a CBA but also in the sense of a CEA if countries have heterogeneous 
preference for the environment and/or different abatement costs. The reason is simple. If those 
countries which contribute on average more to cooperation are also those countries which benefit 
less on average from cooperation, profitability may be violated. As illustrated in the Introduction, a 
CBA and CEA requires those countries that face lower unit abatement costs than other countries 
(e.g., developing countries like Somalia and Ecuador and countries in transition like Russia and 
China in the case of greenhouse gases) and those countries that cause more regional damages than 
other countries (e.g., Great Britain in the case of sulfur) to contribute more to cooperation. As 
argued below, these are also countries that will enjoy low benefits from cooperation where low 
benefits from abatement may be due to various reasons. First, a country or its citizens have lower 
environmental preferences than other countries, even though the objective environmental damage 
caused by pollution may be similar. For instance, due to their lower stage of economic develop-
ment, it is not surprising that developing countries usually put less weight on environmental quality 
but a higher weight on economic growth. Second, a country is less affected by pollution than other 
countries due to its endowment with natural resources. For instance, some studies in the context of 
the greenhouse gas effect come to the conclusion that Russia may even benefit from global 
warming since some currently non-arable land may then be used for agricultural production due to 
more favorable climate conditions. Third, a country is less affected by pollution because of its geo-
graphical location. For instance, Great Britain suffers less from acid rain since a large part of its 
sulfur emissions are transported to the European continent, particularly to the Nordic countries.  
 
It is evident that even if asymmetries are not that strong that profitability is violated, they nev-
ertheless pose a problem for participation and compliance. Those countries which benefit on 
average less than other countries from cooperation have a strong incentive either to remain a non-
signatory or to violate the terms of the agreement.  
 
From a global perspective the finding may be called a paradox. On the one hand, the larger 
asymmetries of unit abatement costs are, the larger are the gains from a cost-efficient allocation of 
abatement burdens compared to a uniform and inefficient allocation. On the other hand, the larger   11
asymmetries of unit abatement costs are, the larger will be the asymmetries from the gains from 
cost-efficient cooperation and the more likely it is that stability of an IEA will be violated.  
 
Generally, there are two measures to balance asymmetries. First, those countries which gain more 
on average compensate those countries which gain less on average or which loose from 
cooperation. Second, abatement burdens are allocated such that the critical countries have to 
contribute less to cooperation. However, as will be argued in section 4, both measures provide no 
straightforward solution and are associated with some disadvantages. Compensations themselves 
suffer from free-rider problems and an allocation of abatement burdens different from the rules of a 
CBA or CEA implies a loss of global welfare.  
 
3.2 Number of Countries Suffering from Pollution 
 
The higher the number of countries affected by pollution, the higher are free-rider incentives. The 
reason is that the more countries suffer from pollution, the smaller is the effect of an individual 
country on environmental quality. On the one hand, if a signatory free-rides, environmental quality 
will deteriorate only marginally. On the other hand, if a non-signatory contributed to cooperation 
via participation in and compliance with an IEA, environmental quality would only improve 
marginally. This finding has also been called a paradox in the literature since it can be shown that 
cooperation is particularly important from a global point of view if many countries suffer from 
transboundary pollution. The reason is simple: the more countries suffer from pollution the higher 
is the degree of externality across countries if countries behave non-cooperatively and hence the 
higher are the global gains from cooperation. 
 
The theoretical result suggests that the reduction of greenhouse gases would bring about large 
welfare gains due to the global character of this pollutant. However, it also explains why it has 
proved so difficult to establish cooperation under the Kyoto Protocol: only 38 countries signed the 
protocol, the US withdrew from the treaty, the protocol has not been ratified and therefore it did not 
go into force by the time this article was written in June 2002 and global abatement amounts only to 
5.2 percent compared to 1990 emission levels. 
 
3.3 Benefit-Cost Ratio from Abatement 
 
The higher the benefit-cost ratio from abatement, the higher are free-rider incentives. The reason is 
that the higher the benefit-cost ratio, the higher will be the implemented global abatement target 
within a coalition and individual contributions of signatories. A high abatement target implies for a 
signatory, which complies with treaty obligations, high unit abatement costs. Consequently, free-
riding is particularly attractive under these conditions since abatement costs drop substantially but 
benefits only marginally. A similar argument applies to non-signatories. Joining a coalition would 
be associated with high additional abatement costs but the effect on environmental quality at the 
margin is only small.  
 
In terms of free-rider incentive of type 1 (see section 2.1), a high benefit-cost ratio implies either 
that only few countries join an IEA or it implies that many countries sign an IEA but that the 
cooperative global abatement level implemented by the coalition only marginally exceeds that in 
the non-cooperative status quo. In terms of free-rider incentive of type 2 (see section 2.1), a high 
benefit-cost ratio implies that either only few signatories comply with their abatement obligations 
or many signatories comply but then abatement obligation will be very moderate and close to non-
cooperative levels.   12
 
This result has also been called a paradox in the literature since the higher the benefit-cost ratio, the 
larger are the gains from cooperation. This is due to a simple economic relation (see the first 
characteristic of a CBA in the Introduction). If costs are relatively high compared to benefits from 
abatement, then also a socially optimal solution would call only for moderate emission reductions. 
Hence, also the difference between a socially optimal solution and the non-cooperative status quo is 
small. This is different if the benefit-cost ratio is high. Then high abatement efforts would be 
advisable from a global point of view and hence it would be particularly unfortunate if countries 
remain close to the status quo. 
 
The theoretical result suggests that success of an IEA cannot be inferred from the number of 
signatories. Moreover, the Montreal Protocol may be less successful than the Kyoto Protocol in the 
long run. Though the Montreal Protocol counts more signatories than the Kyoto Protocol, overall 
abatement may come closer to what is required by a CBA and compliance may be higher under the 
latter than under the former protocol.  
 
3.4 Leakage Effects 
 
The term leakage effect describes the phenomenon that if coalition members increase their 
abatement efforts compared to the status quo, outsiders may reduce their abatement efforts. Though 
this counter reaction does usually not completely offset the efforts of signatories, it negatively 
affects the success of cooperation. Leakage effects are an implication of the fact that in the presence 
of transboundary pollution, abatement is a public good from which no country can be excluded. 
Thus, also non-signatories benefit from higher abatement efforts of signatories via lower 
environmental damages. Consequently, non-signatories pursuing only a national environmental 
policy feel less environmental pressure and adjust their abatement level downward. In some cases, 
this downward adjustment is also encouraged by market effects. For instance, consider the market 
for crude oil. If environmentally conscious countries (signatories) pursue an energy-saving policy, 
the demand for oil will drop and so will prices. Consequently, the use of oil by less environmentally 
conscious countries (non-signatories) increases, which at least partially contradicts the energy 
saving policy by signatories. 
 
It is evident that the larger leakage effects are, the less successful will be cooperation, where the 
extent of leakage effects depends on a number of factors. First, as the example suggests, the higher 
the sensitivity of prices for environmentally damaging products, the higher will be leakage effects. 
Second, the larger the benefit-cost ratio from abatement of non-signatories, the larger will be 
leakage effects. Again, this may seem paradoxical but a high benefit-cost ratio implies that 
abatement efforts of signatories have a large impact on non-signatories via a reduction of 
environmental damages. Consequently, a downward adjustment of abatement efforts is particularly 
encouraged. In terms of a comparison between CFCs and greenhouse gases this result suggests that 
leakage effects will be more important in the case of CFCs than in the case of greenhouse gases. 
Third, the more countries remain outside an IEA, the larger will be leakage effects. Thus, despite 
the fact that more signatories may suggest that it is more difficult to agree on ambitious and 
efficient abatement targets, enlarging a coalition may be a sensible strategy if expected leakage 
effects are large. Consequently, the effort of industrialized nations under the Montreal Protocol to 
provide many incentives for developing countries to join this protocol seems to have been a clever 
strategy in retrospect. In contrast, the result questions the threat of the US to withdraw from the 
Kyoto Protocol if developing countries would not also join this agreement because of the fear of   13
leakage effects. However, taking a long term view their fear may turn out to be not totally 
unwarranted since it is expected that important developing countries like India and China will 
experience much growth in the future associated with large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
3.5 Economies of Scale Effects 
 
An important reason for suboptimal IEAs is that free-rider incentives increase with increasing 
abatement levels. As argued above, the reason is that with increasing abatement activities, unit 
abatement costs increase more than proportionally, whereas unit benefits from abatement increase 
less than proportionally. However, suppose unit costs drop with increasing abatement levels, at 
least in some range, due to economies of scale. This could happen for instance if countries 
coordinate not only their environmental policy but also their research and development (R&D) 
activities. If countries work together to develop clean technologies and share their knowledge, unit 
abatement costs can be reduced. This is particularly true for research activities involving high fixed 
costs, which can then be shared by more countries through cooperation. For instance, the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Montreal Protocol have a provision in their treaties that aims at the exchange of 
technological know-how between industrialized and developing countries.  Also the joint 
implementation of environmental policy measures may generate economies of scale effects. For 
instance, some years ago, the European Commission launched a law that required the installation of 
catalytic converters in all cars sold throughout the EU. The uniform implementation of this law 
implied that the market for unleaded petrol and cars with catalytic converters was no niche but a 
large market, which reduced costs of switching to the new technology.  
 
Scaling effects have two important implications. First, only if enough countries sign an IEA, scaling 
effects will materialize and cooperation will be profitable. The size of this "minimum critical 
coalition" will increase with fixed costs of establishing cooperation on R&D. Second, if the critical 
size is reached, then scaling effects may allow to expand a coalition. This is at least true in some 
range, until diseconomies of scale effects, due to high transaction cost of coordinating 
environmental policy, stemming from too much bureaucracy, become too strong. Thus, in order to 
reap scaling effects, it is important to make sure that the minimum critical coalition forms. 
However, as long as countries are unsure whether enough countries will accede to an IEA, they will 
be careful in putting their signature under a treaty. Therefore, many IEAs have established a 
minimum participation clause which basically says that only if a certain number of countries have 
signed an IEA, the treaty will go into force and will be binding for all signatories. For instance, the 
Kyoto Protocol can only enter into force after signatories responsible for 55 percent of emissions of 
the original signatories of this treaty have ratified the Protocol. 
 
3.6 Planning Horizon and Discounting 
 
The longer the planning horizon, the more governments think ahead when deciding on their 
environmental policy. The less governments discount time, the more weight receive future 
compared to current events. For most international pollution problems it turns out that the longer 
the planning horizon and the less countries discount time, the more successful will be cooperation. 
The reason is the following. First, most international pollutants are stock pollutants which persist 
for a long time in the environmental systems. This is particularly true for global pollutants like 
greenhouse gases which remain in the atmosphere for more than 50 years until they disappear due 
to the natural rate of decay. Thus, abatement efforts taken today have an immediate impact on 
abatement costs but have only a positive impact on climate in the far future. Thus, if governments 
are myopic and/or discount time much, they do not realize benefits from abatement and will   14
therefore not join an IEA. Second, non-compliance with treaty obligations provides a country with a 
temporary free-rider gain. Consequently, if countries are myopic and/or discount time much, they 
value this temporary gain more than the long term gains from cooperation despite the subsequent 
punishment.  
 
In practice, it seems that short-term planning and high discounting pose a problem for solving 
international pollution problems. In most democracies politicians strive for reelection, and, given 
that politicians are usually only elected for 4 or 5 years, they very much depend on short-term 
success. Thus, particularly, previous to elections, discounting will be high and long-term planning 
will play a minor role, jeopardizing the success of IEAs. Therefore, one could think of transferring 
national enforcement from the government to the bureaucracy, which, by nature, is less dependent 
on election cycles. A further measure could be to transform international obligations of an IEA into 
national law as this is mentioned in some IEAs. For instance, the Waigani Convention has a provi-
sion that requires implementing abatement duties into national law. Since interference with the 
judiciary involves high political costs in most democracies, opportunistic behavior of governments 
could be limited by such a measure. 
Moreover, it has been claimed that there is an inverse relationship between the wealth of nations 
and the discounting of time. Following this claim, fostering economic development in developing 
countries would lead these governments to discount time less and the prospects for cooperation 
would be brighter. Such a strategy is pursued under some modern IEAs. For instance, the parties to 
the Montreal Protocol established the so called "Multilateral Fund" which aims at transfering 
environmentally friendly technologies to developing countries under "fair conditions". Transfer 
projects include replacement of CFC-based foam blowing machinery with new non-CFC 
equipment.  
Finally, discounting also depends on the uncertainty of future events. Therefore, investment in 
research about the effect of global warming and the expected abatement costs may be a measure to 
reduce uncertainty and hence the discounting of time. For instance, the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change  has a provision requiring member states to conduct research on the effects of 
global warming. However, as long as the extent of research remains unspecified, obligations cannot 
be enforced. Moreover, in some cases it could be argued that pointing out that more research is 
needed before actions can be taken is only an excuse for delaying the implementation of serious 
abatement measures. 
 
3.7 Reputation Effects 
 
Reputation means either that signatories receive an additional gain from cooperation just from the 
fact that they belong to the "group of good guys" or that non-signatories receive some disutility 
because they belong to the "group of bad guys". Thus, reputation is also associated with the notion 
of fairness and political correctness. It can be shown that the larger the reputation effect is, the 
larger will be the number of signatories and the more successful is cooperation. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, this result is hardly surprising. In fact, assuming enough sense of 
fairness, any problem of cooperation can trivially be solved. From a practical point of view, the 
result may be more interesting. Reputation effects may be encouraged through governmental and 
non-governmental institutions that regularly publish the members of an IEA, their abatement 
obligations, their compliance records and the overall success of an IEA in terms of achieving 
ecological targets. Thereby, environmental issues and the performance of individual countries   15
become more transparent to the public, which may increase the pressure on governments to behave 
environmentally friendly.  
 
4. Issues of Treaty Design Influencing the Success of Cooperation 
 
4.1 Membership Rules: open versus exclusive membership 
 
Open membership implies that any country, which wants to join an agreement, can become a 
signatory to an IEA. In contrast, exclusive membership means that accession is only possible by the 
consent of present members. Empirical evidence suggests that almost all protocols of major past 
IEAs allow for unrestricted accessions of new members. From a theoretical point of view, things 
look different, though at first thought one would expect that the membership rule should make no 
difference: abatement constitutes a public good and therefore signatories of an IEA should always 
welcome new coalition members. At second thought, however, it is evident that additional members 
may also be associated with negative effects, which can be avoided under exclusive but not under 
open membership. First, additional members require that not only new members but also former 
members must adjust their environmental policy. The reason is that only if also former members 
increase their abatement efforts can it be rational for new members to join an IEA (otherwise new 
members have to carry additional abatement costs but receive no reward). This may cause 
instability and encourage former members to leave an IEA. Second, additional members may only 
join an IEA for reputational reasons and hence are less inclined to comply with the terms of an IEA. 
This may provide a bad example for other signatories. Third, additional members imply that it 
becomes more difficult to implement ambitious abatement targets in future amendment protocols 
since in most IEAs decisions can only be passed by unanimity. Consequently, comparing the 
theoretical results with the empirical evidence suggests that it may be worthwhile adopting 
exclusive membership rule that is typical for club good agreements (non-members can be excluded 
from the benefits of the club) also for public good agreements IEAs (nobody can be excluded from 
the benefits from abatement) in future environmental treaties. Though such a change of membership 
rule has no effect on the nature of an IEA (an IEA is and remains a public good agreement), it may 
nevertheless be conducive to stability of such treaties.  
 
4.2 Number of Signatories: Grand Coalition versus Subcoalition 
 
The empirical evidence reported in the Introduction suggests that framework conventions that only 
constitute declarations of intentions enjoy almost full participation but that fewer countries sign 
IEAs with serious and ambitious abatement obligations. The empirical evidence is much in line 
with the prediction of theory. The higher implemented abatement targets in an IEA are, the higher 
will be free-rider incentives, and the lower will be participation and compliance. Moreover, theory 
also provides some rationales why a subcoalition (an IEA comprising less than all countries) may 
be superior to the grand coalition (an IEA comprising all countries), though the grand coalition has 
two advantages. First, the more countries sign an IEA, the smaller is the group of outsiders, which 
reduces leakage effects. Second, the more countries accede to an IEA, the more countries can 
shoulder abatement burdens and hence the easier it is to design a cost-efficient allocation abatement 
scheme. In order to achieve a given global abatement target, individual countries in a subcoalition 
must contribute much more to cooperation compared to the grand coalition, which may drive up 
unit abatement costs substantially. This is particularly true if many countries with low unit costs of 
abatement do not accede to an IEA. However, the grand coalition has also two important 
disadvantages. First, the more countries sign an IEA, the more difficult it is to agree on ambitious 
abatement targets. Since the signature of IEAs is based on voluntary participation, agreeing on the   16
smallest common denominator within a large group of countries may lead to very lax environmental 
standards. Second, the more countries participate an IEA, the more difficult it is to enforce 
compliance. Overall, the net effect on the success of cooperation depends on whether the first two 
effects are stronger than the last two effects. From the theoretical literature it appears that a 
subcoalition is superior to the grand coalition for those parameter constellations which negatively 
affect the success of IEAs: a large number of countries suffering from pollution, a high benefit-cost 
ratio from abatement and a high degree of asymmetry between countries (see section 3).  
 
4.3 Number of Coalitions: single versus multiple coalitions 
 
A single coalition structure means that countries have only the option to accede to or to stay out of 
an IEA. A multiple coalition structure implies that countries can form regional agreements so that 
several IEAs may exist at the same time. Empirical evidence suggests that all IEAs regulating a 
particular pollutant are single agreements. In contrast, coalition models allowing for the possibility 
of multiple coalitions predict that several regional IEAs will form in equilibrium. The coalitions in a 
multiple coalition structure are not necessarily larger than the coalition in a single coalition 
structure because the free-rider incentive constitutes a restriction for forming larger coalitions. 
However, if countries can freely form coalitions, some singletons (non-signatories) in the single 
coalition structure will merge and form their own coalition instead of remaining non-signatories. 
Consequently, a multiple coalition structure implies higher global abatement and larger global 
welfare than a single coalition structure. 
 
Comparing the empirical evidence with the theoretical findings, two controversial conjectures come 
to mind. First, if existing IEAs are the result of an unrestricted coalition formation process, then the 
predictions of the coalition models are wrong. However, it seems that this theoretical result is very 
robust, though, admittedly, it has been derived from stylized models. Second, if coalition formation 
has been restricted for institutional and/or political reasons in the past, this suggests altering the 
rules in the future. For instance, under the Kyoto Protocol the US insisted that they would only 
ratify the treaty if also developing countries would accede to this agreement. Thus, it may be the 
case that more could have been achieved if separate agreements were designed for industrialized 
countries, developing countries and countries in transition. This last remark points at the possibility 
to reconcile both conjectures. Taking a broader perspective, some modern IEAs, as for instance the 
Oslo Protocol on sulfur reductions, may be interpreted as separate agreements under the umbrella of 
one treaty since they impose differentiated abatement obligations on participants. In any case, the 
result clearly suggests that more emphasis should be placed on designing IEAs in the future, which 
take more care of the heterogeneous interests of countries. 
 
4.4 Compensation Measures: monetary versus in-kind transfers 
 
Transfers are an obvious instrument for compensating the losers from cooperation, increasing 
participation in an IEA and encouraging compliance. Possible compensation measures are monetary 
and in-kind transfers, which comprise for instance technical assistance to developing countries from 
industrialized countries. Whereas monetary transfers directly target at compensation, in-kind 
transfers do so only indirectly and hence the aim of compensation is often blurred and overlapped 
by other aims. Therefore, theoretically, efficiency of in-kind transfers is lower than of monetary 
transfers. However, the order of frequency of the application of these instruments is reversed in 
practice. Almost all IEAs have no provisions for monetary transfers. One prominent exception is 
the Montreal Protocol under which a multilateral fund has been established to which industrialized 
countries are supposed to contribute and where developing countries and countries in transition can   17
receive support. However, recipients receive only transfers for those costs (incremental costs) that 
occur in excess of abatement activities compared to the status quo. This implies for most 
developing countries that they just break even compared to the status quo. Moreover, outstanding 
contributions to the fund amount to roughly 12 to 16 percent per year, transfers are often delayed, 
some donors only issued promissory notes and some donors have fulfilled their obligations only in 
the form of in-kind transfers. A second prominent exception is the Convention of Biological 
Diversity signed in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro where developing countries can receive support from the 
"Global Environmental Facility". However, this fund also covers only incremental costs and the 
backlog of transfers is very large. A third exception, though different, is the Kyoto Protocol. Under 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM; Article 12) signatories can reduce their abatement 
burdens by financing "project activities resulting in certified additional emission reductions" in 
developing countries that are not signatories to the protocol. However, it has to be stressed that this 
protocol is not in force yet. In contrast to monetary transfers, the number of IEAs including 
provisions for technical exchange and assistance between industrialized and developing countries is 
larger. However, a closer reading reveals that obligations under most IEAs are very vague and 
promises seem often only lip service.  
 
Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that compensation measures are not that easily imple-
mented in reality and that if they are implemented in-kind transfers are preferred to monetary 
transfers. The theoretical literature has explained this phenomenon with strategic behavior of 
governments and with compliance problems. Strategic behavior applies to transfers in general and 
includes the following arguments. First, transfers provide an incentive for governments to 
strategically misrepresent their preferences. A donor has an incentive to understate its envi-
ronmental preferences and overstate its abatement cost in order to convince other signatories that it 
should not contribute so much to an environmental fund. A recipient has an incentive to bias its 
stated preferences in the same direction so as to convince other countries that if it is required to 
contribute to a joint abatement policy at all, it should at least be generously compensated. Second, 
any transfer scheme must be based on some criteria that require that the welfare implications of an 
abatement policy are estimated and publicly disclosed. Such a transparency, however, may not be in 
the interest of all governments since it limits their strategic behavior in the future. Third, 
governments may be skeptical of paying transfers since they fear that they may be judged as weak 
bargaining partners which may weaken their bargaining power with respect to other issues in the 
future. 
 
Compliance problems have two dimensions. First, monetary transfers create a free-rider incentive 
between donor and recipient. Either the recipient may take the transfer but does not fulfill its 
promised abatement obligations or the recipient fulfills its part of the deal but the donor does not 
pay promised transfers. In contrast, in-kind transfers, like the installation of clean technology in 
developing countries, suffer less from non-compliance. The reason is that it is more difficult for 
recipients to abuse in-kind transfers for other purposes and donors will only enjoy the benefits from 
transfers once they have completed the project. However, it has also been shown in the literature 
that the free-rider incentive of monetary transfers can substantially be reduced under the following 
conditions. a) If transactions happen over a longer period of time, compliance on the side of the 
recipient can be enforced with the threat to suspend transfer payments in the future. Thus, transfers 
can be used as sanctions, which will be discussed in more detail below. b) If transfers are paid in 
small amounts, then free-rider incentives become smaller on both sides, compliance can be checked 
in shorter intervals and counter measures can be faster. c) Transactions can be based on past 
compliance records. For this it might be helpful establishing a rating system like in financial   18
markets, which informs donor and recipient about the reliability of promises and behavior of 
payment.  
 
Second, monetary and in-kind transfers create a free-rider incentive within the group of donor 
countries. Though the group of donors as a whole benefits from transfers through higher par-
ticipation and compliance, individual donors are better off if they take a free-ride. The main 
problem is that it is hardly possible to control this type of free-riding behavior. Until now, no IEA 
has a provision that sanctions industrialized countries if they do not fulfill their transfer obligations. 
The only possibility is to appeal to the reputation of countries by regularly publishing the 
compliance record of donors. The reason that many industrialized countries prefer to fulfill their 
transfer obligations if at all via in-kind transfers may be that this allows for a higher participation of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations in donor countries. Thus, it seems that in-kind 
transfers are sometimes only disguised subsidies for domestic organizations. 
 
4.5 Issue Linkage: an alternative to monetary transfers 
 
An alternative compensation measure is issue linkage where concessions in one agreement are 
exchanged against concession in another agreement. Since package deals are sometimes secretly 
negotiated, it is not that easy to gather empirical evidence. Most reported examples include bilateral 
links. For instance, it has been suggested that the Columbia River Treaty of 1961 between the US 
and Canada, which viewed as a single issue was to the disadvantage of the US, was built on 
concessions by Canada involving North American defense. In the context of multilateral 
agreements only a wider interpretation allows to detect some form of issue linkage. One example is 
the Montreal Protocol where the import and export of controlled substances with non-parties is 
banned (Article 4). A second example is the efforts of some member states of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and non-governmental organizations not only to promote free trade within 
WTO but also the establishment of environmental standards in the production and consumption of 
traded goods and services. Both examples may be interpreted as a link between an IEA and a trade 
agreement. Also the provision of technical assistance and exchange under many protocols may be 
interpreted as a link between an IEA and an agreement to share the cost of R&D.  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that issue linkage may be a useful instrument for cooperation. This 
positive conclusion is confirmed by theoretical results. On the one hand, issue linkage balances 
asymmetries and thus has a positive effect on profitability and compliance. However, this balancing 
effect can only materialize if asymmetries of issues are more or less mirror images. Moreover, in 
contrast to monetary and in-kind transfers, which balance asymmetries between countries, issue 
linkage balances asymmetries between issues. Therefore, compliance problems between donor and 
recipient are less important than in the case of monetary transfers since each country is not only a 
donor but also a recipient. However, the compliance problem within the group of donor countries, 
as observed for monetary and in-kind transfers, is also a problem. In the case of more than two 
countries each country has an incentive not to offer its preferred issue for compensation. This point 
may explain why issue linkage has been observed mainly in the context of bilateral agreements.  
 
On the other hand, issue linkage can have a positive effect on participation if an IEA is linked to 
another agreement that enjoys a higher participation. Agreements with potentially higher 
participation are in particular club good agreements in which the gains from cooperation are 
exclusive to signatories and therefore free-riding is of minor importance. Typical club good 
agreements include agreements on R&D and trade agreements. Under an R&D agreement firms in   19
signatory countries share the costs of R&D, implying that those firms reduce their marginal and 
average production costs compared to firms in non-signatory countries. The lower spillovers of 
R&D to outsiders are, the higher is the degree of excludability and the larger is the competitive 
advantage of firms in signatory over firms in non-signatory countries. Also in a trade agreement 
firms in signatory countries have a competitive advantage over outsiders through external trade 
barriers (e.g., tariffs or trade bans). Thus, the strategy of this type of issue linkage is to raise the 
incentive for countries to contribute to pollution abatement via the threat that if they do not join the 
linked agreement they will also not enjoy the benefits from the club good agreement. Though this 
strategy is generally successful, it may not work if there are strong incentives in the club good 
agreement to limit the number of participants for strategic reasons. 
 
Thus, theory generally draws a positive picture of issue linkage, though at least two problems will 
limit the application of this instrument in practice. First, negotiating several issues will be a time 
consuming business in the context of multilateral agreements comprising many countries. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that issue linkage has been mainly used in the bilateral context. 
Second, in reality, membership will be mixed. It is hard to imagine that countries are excluded from 
a trade agreement or defense pact if they do not sign an IEA. In the context of the Montreal 
Protocol this was no problem since the trade agreement part was simultaneously created with the 
environmental agreement part of this protocol and trade sanctions apply only to those products 
regulated under this protocol. 
 
4.6 Global Abatement Levels: less is more  
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, global abatement levels usually fall short of what would be 
required from the globally optimal solution, questioning the effectiveness of past IEAs. From a 
theoretical point of view, this is not surprising. First, as has been pointed out and explained 
previously, the higher the global abatement level, the higher are free-rider incentives. Thus, it 
suffices to stress here that this result is very general and holds irrespective of the allocation of 
abatement burdens. Second, most IEAs require agreement by consensus. Thus, signatories will 
usually only agree on the smallest common denominator, implying that only moderate global 
abatement levels can be implemented. However, what is more surprising is that in the presence of 
free-rider incentives the apparent disadvantage of low abatement levels may turn out to be an 
advantage. On the one hand, moderate abatement levels imply a higher rate of compliance, which 
may compensate higher abatement levels but a lower rate of compliance. On the other hand, 
moderate abatement levels lead to a higher participation, which may compensate higher abatement 
levels but a low participation. In other words, sometimes, less is more! Though what "sometimes" 
means has not exactly been established in the literature, it appears that less is more for those 
parameter constellations (large asymmetries, large number of affected countries and high benefit-
cost ratio), which imply high free-rider incentives (see section 3). 
 
4.7 Allocation of Abatement Levels: command and control versus market-based instruments 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, individual abatement levels are usually not allocated cost-
efficiently. Many IEAs apply the command and control instrument uniform emission reduction 
quotas. In contrast, cost-efficient market-based instruments, like emission taxes and  emission 
permits, have not been applied in past IEAs. The only exception is the Kyoto Protocol that allows 
for permit trading under Article 17. However, despite very long negotiations until now, no final 
agreement could be reached on the design of the permit system and currently it is not evident   20
whether it will eventually be implemented. In the literature the following points have been made to 
explain this phenomenon. 
 
First, uniform emission reduction quotas are inefficient as long as countries are heterogeneous since 
they do not consider that unit abatement costs differ across countries. However, they possess three 
important advantages that may explain their frequent appearance. a) Uniform abatement obligations 
constitute some kind of a focal point on which countries can agree easily. This saves negotiation 
time and therefore transaction costs. b) Countries negotiating about uniform emissions reduction 
quotas require only information about present emissions in order to put forward a proposal. Given 
that information about abatement costs and benefits from abatement are uncertain for most 
pollutants, this limits the possibility of strategic offers. c) Uniform emission reduction quotas imply 
that all countries contribute the same amount in relative terms compared to the status quo. 
Therefore, they lead to a relatively symmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation. This has 
the advantage that for not too high abatement levels profitability will not be violated and 
compliance and participation will be relatively high. Moreover, given the need for consensus, it can 
be shown that critical countries agree on relatively high abatement levels compared to other policy 
instruments.  
 
Second, emission taxes and emission permits imply an efficient allocation of abatement burdens. 
However, in the presence of free-rider incentives, they possess some disadvantages, which may 
explain that they have not been applied in the past. The disadvantages include the following items. 
a) Taxes lead to an asymmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation in the case of asymmetric 
countries, which may violate profitability and which implies high free-rider incentives. Hence, 
critical countries agree if at all only on moderate abatement levels. b) One possibility to avoid 
asymmetries could be the implementation of an international tax by an international environmental 
agency that balances asymmetries via the reallocating of tax revenues. However, since it can be 
expected that governments show a great reluctance to hand over their tax sovereignty to an 
international body, this option seems not feasible. c)  Another possibility could be the 
implementation of a national tax where those governments, which benefit more than proportionally 
from cooperation, transfer some of their tax revenues to other countries. However, this option faces 
the same free-rider problems as mentioned under monetary transfer. d) Negotiations on national and 
international taxes require information on abatement costs in order to estimate the economic 
reactions of industry. This gives much leeway to governments to make strategic proposal during 
negotiations since this information is uncertain by its nature. e) Tradable emission permits imply 
monetary transfers between those countries buying and those selling permits. Hence, these 
transactions are also subject to free-riding. This may explain why under the Kyoto Protocol a 
second trading system without monetary transactions has been established. Under Joint 
Implementation (Article 3 and 4) signatories can jointly meet their targets in the form of a bubble. 
f)  Though the mode of allocating emission permits has no effect on efficiency, it affects 
distribution. Therefore, tough bargaining among negotiators about the initial permit allocation can 
be expected. g) Also negotiations about the allocation of permits require information on abatement 
costs and hence strategic bargaining will hamper quick agreement. 
 
However, despite the disadvantages of market-based instruments, they may play some role in future 
IEAs. Based on the discussion above, a blue print of implementation could look as follows. In a 
first step uniform emission reduction quotas are allocated and trading is only allowed among those 
countries that can credibly promise to monitor and enforce transactions. Permit trading should only 
be allowed between countries and not between industries across borders since this eases the control   21
of transactions. In a second step, after some experience has been gained from permit trading, the 
permit system may be expanded to allow for trade among private entities across borders and to 




Obvious measures to control free-riding are sanctions. However, empirical evidence tells us that 
most IEAs have no provision for sanctions. Probably, the only exception of sanctioning non-
participation is the above-mentioned Article 4 under the Montreal Protocol, which imposes trade 
sanctions on non-signatories. For sanctioning non-compliance most IEAs have only a provision for 
the establishment of an arbitration and dispute settlement committee if a party accuses another of 
violating the spirit of an agreement. Due to the voluntary character of these arbitration schemes and 
since provisions contain no threats of punishment, it is not surprising that there are no reported in-
stances of application. Again, the Montreal Protocol is an exception where the parties first agreed 
on an indicative list of measures (Annex V) at their 4th meeting in Copenhagen in 1992 and then 
defined non-compliance at their 6th meeting in Nairobi in 1994. The measures include a) assistance 
for the collection and the reporting of data, technical assistance, technology transfers and financial 
assistance, b) issuing cautions and c) suspension of specific rights and privileges including transfers 
of technology, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements. It is evident that only the last 
item can be regarded as sanctions and obviously can only be used against developing countries. For 
instance, if a developing country does not report baseline data within one year, they are no longer 
given Article 5 status. This status exempts these countries from certain regulations and allows them 
drawing on financial assistance. However, any formal statement of non-compliance by the 
Implementation Committee has to be passed by unanimity, which hampers quick implementation of 
sanctions. Another exemption is the Kyoto Protocol where the parties agreed at the meeting in 
Marrakech in 2001 on "Consequences Applied by the Enforcement Branch" (Annex XV). Similar 
to the Montreal Protocol, most measures include assistance to meet the targets rather than tough 
sanctions and complicated voting procedures precede any formal statement of non-compliance. 
However, two tough punishment options have been decided: A party a) may be excluded from the 
emission trading system and b) must reduce 30 percent more of its assigned emissions in the second 
commitment period (2013-2017). It remains to be observed whether these sanctions will be used in 
the future. 
 
The empirical evidence on sanctions suggests that the design of effective sanctions faces various 
problems. From a theoretical point of view, this not surprising because of the following reasons.  
 
1)  Sanctioning countries for not acceding to an IEA is at odds with the notion of voluntary 
participation. That the Montreal Protocol is the only exception may be due to strong lobbying of the 
US industry for trade sanctions against outsiders. Since US-industry had developed substances that 
could replace CFCs, involving a high level of technical know-how, they had a strong interest to 
secure their competitive advantage over developing countries, which could only compete with 
cheap CFCs.  
 
2) Sanctions often have also a negative effect on those countries carrying out the punishment. Thus, 
harsh sanctions are not always credible and constitute themselves a public good that is subject to 
free-riding. This explains not only in the environmental context why governments are often 
reluctant to impose sanctions against other countries and why for instance trade embargoes 
frequently failed in the past.  
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3)  Sanctioning non-compliance is flawed by the fact that under most treaties signatories can 
withdraw from the agreement after giving notice 3 (Kyoto Protocol, Article 27) or 4 years 
(Montreal Protocol, Article 19) in advance. Thus, sanctions can only last for a few months and must 
be moderate since otherwise a country leaves an IEA to avoid punishment.  
 
4) Coordination of sanctions among signatories is time consuming and costly and therefore will 
often be delayed. A solution to this problem could be the establishment of simple and transparent 
punishment procedures. However, simple means also suboptimal punishment and hence a lower 
threat to free-riding.  
 
5) Trade sanctions may be in conflict with the regulations of WTO and may jeopardize stability of 
other agreements.  
 
In the light of these problems, the enforcement measures under the Montreal and Kyoto Protocol 
can be evaluted as follows. 
 
1)  The suspension of transfers as suggested under the Montreal Protocol in the case of treaty 
violations perfectly satisfies the conditions of renegotiation-proof punishment, though this type of 
sanctions can only be used against developing countries. First, punishers (industrialized countries) 
do not suffer a disadvantage from this punishment since donors are better off if they do not pay 
transfers. Second, the punished countries (developing countries) can be provided with an incentive 
to accept this punishment. For this it is important the punishment lasts not too long and that the 
punishers clearly indicate under which conditions they will resume payments so that treaty violators 
have an incentive to remain in an IEA.  
 
2) The exclusion from the emission trading system, as suggested under the Kyoto Protocol, seems a 
less clever strategy. The reason is that permit trading takes place voluntarily and hence trading 
implies a win-win situation. Consequently, excluding a country from trading will also harm 
punishers. A solution to this problem could be the following modification. Instead of excluding a 
seller of permits from trading, its revenues are transferred to an environmental fund for some time. 
Instead of excluding a buyer of permits from trading, this country should pay a mark-up on the ordi-
nary permit prices. In both cases, the surplus can be used for compensation of other signatories. 
These measures also point to another role of transfers for sanctioning treaty violators in a 
renegotiation-proof way. If each country were to pay transfers into an environmental fund, then 
similarly to union funds, which are used to back up strikes by reducing the negative effect of strikes 
on their members (suspension of payment, lay-off of workers and so forth), this money could be 
used to mitigate the negative effects of sanctions for punishers. This would improve upon the 
credibility of sanctions.  
 
3) A change of abatement levels is another alternative instrument for sanctioning violation of treaty 
obligations. On the one hand, each government will recognize that if it does not meet its reduction 
duties, other governments have the right to follow suit according to the principle of reciprocity and 
reduce their abatement efforts too. On the other hand, once abatement measures have been taken, it 
is not that easy for punishers to reduce their abatement efforts. In particular, most abatement 
measures involve high set-up costs that would be "sunk" if punishers changed their environmental 
policy. But also treaty violators are also not very flexible in increasing their abatement efforts in the 
short-run as a sign of repentance in order to return to normal terms as quickly as possible. 
Moreover, generally, a reduction of abatement efforts can only harm countries that evaluate   23
environmental damages sufficiently high. Consequently, this type of sanction cannot be used 
against developing countries but only against industrialized countries.  
 
In the light of these preliminary remarks, the 30 percent additional emission reduction of treaty 
violators as suggested under the Kyoto Protocol seems to be a punishment strategy in the right 
direction. a) All important signatories are industrialized countries or countries in transition and 
hence the suspension of transfers as suggested by the Montreal Protocol would be no feasible 
option. b) Additional abatement efforts by treaty violators compensate countries that comply with 
their treaty obligations. Thus, punishers suffer no disadvantage from sanctions. c) Punishment in the 
second and not in the first commitment period allows the treaty violator more flexibility to meet its 
obligations. d) However, the time gap between treaty violation and sanctions reduces the threat 
potential of sanctions if governments discount time. In particular, the government responsible for 
treaty violation and the government, which has to conduct additional abatement efforts, may not be 
the same. Hence, it is easy for the successor government to claim that it is not responsible for the 
misconduct of previous governments. However, this problem could easily be solved with the 
following modification. Punishment starts immediately but at low levels and punishment duties are 
allocated over a longer period of time in order to ensure flexibility. In order to provide governments 
with an incentive to implement additional abatement measure fast, immediate action should be 
rewarded with generous reductions of future abatement obligations. e) Sanctions are to weak in case 
a country continuously violates a treaty and shows no reprentance. Therefore, the Kyoto Protocol 
should include a threat that signatories will reduce their abatement efforts if the treaty violator 
continues with ignoring the rules of the protocol.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The lack of a supranational enforcement authority makes it difficult in reality to implement first or 
second best solutions for international pollution problems. Three main obstacles have been 
identified. First, cooperation may not be profitable for all countries if participants to an IEA face 
different abatement costs and benefits from abatement. Second, even if an IEA would be profitable 
to all participants, individual countries face two types of free-rider incentives. The first type is to 
remain a non-signatory (non-participation) and the second type of is to violate the spirit of an IEA 
(non-compliance). The reason is that nobody can be excluded from the public good clean 
environment provided by those countries that participate in IEA and comply with its terms. 
Paradoxically, under those conditions where cooperation would generate large global welfare gains, 
free-riding is particularly pronounced. Unfortunately, there are no straightforward counter measures 
to neutralize free-rider incentives. Since accession to an IEA is voluntarily only carrots can be used 
to increase participations, which, however, may be subject to free-riding itself. Also the stick 
cannot always be used to punish non-compliance since sanctions have to be credible. Thus, there is 
no universal instrument that can solve all problems. Therefore, a mix of instruments has to be used 
in order to narrow the gap between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions. Some of the 
most promising steps in this direction that have been mentioned in the text are the following.  
 
1) Transfers may be used to provide developing countries and countries in transition with an 
incentive to join an IEA. If those countries do not fulfill their treaty obligations, a credible 
punishment is to suspend transfer payments for some time. 2) Non-compliance of industrialized 
countries can be punished by other participants through a reduction of abatement efforts and the 
enforcement of obligations that the violator has to increase its abatement efforts for some time. 
However, this punishment will only work if the violator accepts his additional duties. Therefore,   24
punishment obligations must be flexible and the punished country must be rewarded with the 
prospect that cooperation is resumed soon. 3) Governmental and non-governmental organizations 
should regularly publish the status of ratification, the overall success of a treaty as well as the 
compliance records and abatement obligations of individual countries. This puts environmental 
conscious voters in the position to put pressure on their governments and encourages reputation 
effects. 4) Cooperation on research and development may create economies of scale effects. This 
can reduce abatement costs and may thus encourage participation in IEAs. 5) Abatement 
obligations may be implemented into national law that makes it more difficult for governments to 
violate the terms of IEAs. 6) For regional environmental problems issue linkage may be a 
successful strategy to balance asymmetries between countries in order to raise participation and 
compliance. 7) For global environmental problems several regional agreements among relatively 
homogenous countries may be superior to a global agreement since the individual interests of 
participants can be better accounted for. 8) Small IEAs may be superior to large IEAs since more 
ambitious abatement targets can be implemented and compliance can be better enforced. However, 
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Objectives  Status of Membership 
Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 
(FCCC) 
framework convention preceeding the Kyoto 
Protocol; expresses concern about climate change 
due to greenhouse gases; no binding emission 
ceilings were set 
signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 by 
166 countries; entered into force in 
1994; presently counts 186 parties  
Kyoto Protocol  targets at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 
5.2 percent based on 1990 emission levels to be 
achieved in the period 2008-2012; emission 
reduction of major emitters between 6 and 8 percent 
signed in Kyoto in 1997 by 38 
countries; has not yet entered into 
force 
Vienna Convention  framework convention precceeding the 5 subsequent 
protocols; expresses concern about the depletion of 
the ozone layer through CFCs and halons, no 
binding emission ceilings were set 
signed in Vienna in 1985 by 28 
countries, entered into force in 
1988, currently counts 182 parties  
Montreal Protocol  CFCs have to be cut to half of 1986 levels by 1999; 
starting with a freeze of production and consumption 
within one year after the protocol will be in force; 
freeze of halons at 1986-levels 
signed in Montreal in 1987 by 46 
countries; entered into force in 
1989, currently counts 181 parties 
London amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol 
further reduction of CFCs; complete phase-out by 
2000; new substances were included in the list of 
harmful substances 
signed in London in 1990; entered 
into force in 1992; currently counts 
153 parties 
Copenhagen amendment 
to the Montreal Protocol 
tightening of the timetable for the reduction of ozone 
depleting substances; most substances have to be 
eliminated by 1996 
signed in Copenhagen in 1992; 
entered into force in 1994; 
presently counts 128 parties  
Montreal amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol 
tightening of the timetable for the phaseout of 
methyl bromide; establishment of a new licensing 
system for controlling trade ozone depleting 
substances 
signed in Montreal in 1997; 
entered into force in 1999; 
currently counts 63 parties 
Beijing amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol 
establishment of monitoring system to control 
bromochloromethane and new trade rules for 
hydrochloroflurocarbons (HCFCs) that were 
developed as replacements for CFCs 
signed in Beijing in 1999; entered 





framework convention preceeding the subsequent 4 
protocols (and other protocols); expresses concern 
about transboundary pollution problems (e.g., 
acidification of lakes and soils) 
signed in Geneva in 1979 by 33 
countries; entered into force in 
1983; currently counts 48 parties 
Helsinki Protocol  targets at 30 percent reduction of sulfur emissions 
based on 1980 levels by 1993 
signed in Helsinki in 1985 by 19 
countries; entered into force in 
1987; currently counts 22 parties  
Sofia Protocol  targets at uniform freeze of nitrogen oxides at 1987 
levels by 1995 
signed in Sofia in 1988 by 25 
countries; entered into force in 
1991; currently counts 28 parties 
Geneva Protocol  targets at 30 percent reduction of volatile organic 
compounds based on 1998 levels by 1999 
signed in Geneva in 1991 by 23 
countries; entered into force in 
1997; currently counts 21 parties; 5 
signatories have not yet ratified the 
treaty; 3 countries acceeded later 
Oslo Protocol  follow-up protocol of the Helsinki Protocol; sets 
tighter non-uniform emission ceilings to be achieved 
by 2000 so that critical loads are not exceeded 
signed in Oslo 1994 by 28 
countries; entered into force in 
1998; currently counts 24 parties; 4 
signatories have not yet ratified the 
treaty 
Convention on 
International Trade in 
Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) 
banning of commercial international trade with 
endangered species  
signed in Washington D.C. in 1973 
by 47 countries; entered into force 
in 1975; currently counts 152 
parties   28
 
The International 
Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling 
(ICRW) 
establishment of a system of international 
regulations to ensure the conservation and 
development of whale stocks 
signed in Washington D.C. in 1946 
by 15 countries; entered into force 
in 1948; currently counts 48 parties
The Waigani Convention   regional convention in the South Pacific region to 
ban the importation of hazardous and radioactive 
wastes and to control the movement of these 
substances 
signed in Waigani, Papua New 
Guinea, in 1995 by 14 countries; 
entered into force in 2001; 
currently counts 8 parties; 7 
signatories have not yet ratified the 
treaty 
The Columbia River 
Treaty 
coordination of flood control and electrical energy 
production in the Columbia River Basin between the 
United States and Canada 
signed in 1961 by the USA and 
Canada; further negotiations 
resulted in a protocol signed and 
ratified in 1964. 
Legend: Signature means the formal acceptance of treaty targets by the negotiators of a treaty. Ratification is the formal 
confirmation and approval of a treaty that is necessary for a treaty to become binding. Accession means that a state is 
not among the original negotiators (signatories) and enters a treaty at a later stage. Accession implies de facto signature 
and ratification at the same time. Entry into force means that treaty provisions become binding, which requires usually 
a certain number of ratifications and/or accessions. Signatories comprise countries that signed a treaty and parties 
comprise countries which deposited their formal confirmation and approval of a treaty through ratification or accession.  
  
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 






NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2003 
    
PRIV 1.2003  Gabriella CHIESA and Giovanna NICODANO: Privatization and Financial Market Development: Theoretical 
Issues 
PRIV 2.2003  Ibolya SCHINDELE: Theory of Privatization in Eastern Europe: Literature Review 
PRIV 3.2003  Wietze LISE, Claudia KEMFERT and Richard S.J. TOL: Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity 
Market 
CLIM 4.2003  Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of 
Government Commitment 
KNOW 5.2003  Reyer GERLAGH: Induced Technological Change under Technological Competition 
ETA 6.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO: Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model 
SIEV 7.2003  Anna ALBERINI, Alberto LONGO, Stefania TONIN, Francesco TROMBETTA and Margherita TURVANI: The 
Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: 
Evidence from Surveys of Developers 
NRM 8.2003  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse? 
CLIM 9.2003  A. CAPARRÓS, J.-C. PEREAU and T. TAZDAÏT: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game 
with Asymmetric Information 
KNOW 10.2003  Giorgio BRUNELLO and Daniele CHECCHI: School Quality and Family Background in Italy  
CLIM 11.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Learning By Doing vs Learning By Researching in a Model of 
Climate Change Policy Analysis 
KNOW 12.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI (eds.): Economic Growth, Innovation, Cultural 
Diversity: What are we all talking about? A critical survey of the state-of-the-art 
KNOW 13.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO, Dino PINELLI and Francesco RULLANI (lix): Bio-Ecological 
Diversity vs. Socio-Economic Diversity. A Comparison of Existing Measures  
KNOW 14.2003  Maddy JANSSENS and Chris STEYAERT (lix): Theories of Diversity within Organisation Studies: Debates and 
Future Trajectories 
KNOW 15.2003  Tuzin BAYCAN LEVENT, Enno MASUREL and Peter NIJKAMP (lix): Diversity in Entrepreneurship: Ethnic and 
Female Roles in Urban Economic Life  
KNOW 16.2003  Alexandra BITUSIKOVA (lix): Post-Communist City on its Way from Grey to Colourful: The Case Study from 
Slovakia 
KNOW 17.2003  Billy E. VAUGHN and Katarina MLEKOV (lix): A Stage Model of Developing an Inclusive Community 




19.2003  Sergio CURRARINI: On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities 
PRIV 20.2003  Giacomo CALZOLARI and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Monopoly with Resale 
PRIV 21.2003  Claudio MEZZETTI (lx): Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation 
Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition 
PRIV 22.2003  Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-
Price Auctions  
PRIV 23.2003  David ETTINGER (lx): Bidding among Friends and Enemies 
PRIV 24.2003  Hannu VARTIAINEN (lx): Auction Design without Commitment 
PRIV 25.2003  Matti KELOHARJU, Kjell G. NYBORG and Kristian RYDQVIST (lx): Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in 
Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions 
PRIV 26.2003  Christine A. PARLOUR and Uday RAJAN (lx): Rationing in IPOs 
PRIV 27.2003  Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lx): Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes 
PRIV 28.2003  Anders LUNANDER and Jan-Eric NILSSON (lx): Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative 
Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts 
PRIV 29.2003  TangaMcDANIEL and Karsten NEUHOFF (lx): Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment  
PRIV 30.2003  Emiel MAASLAND and Sander ONDERSTAL (lx): Auctions with Financial Externalities 
ETA 31.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive 
Externality NTU-Coalition Games  
KNOW 32.2003  Michele MORETTO: Competition and Irreversible Investments under Uncertainty_  
PRIV 33.2003  Philippe QUIRION: Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture? 
KNOW 34.2003  Giuseppe MEDA, Claudio PIGA and Donald SIEGEL: On the Relationship between R&D and Productivity: A 
Treatment Effect Analysis 
ETA 35.2003  Alessandra DEL BOCA, Marzio GALEOTTI and Paola ROTA: Non-convexities in the Adjustment of Different 
Capital Inputs: A Firm-level Investigation   GG 36.2003  Matthieu GLACHANT: Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats  
PRIV 37.2003  Narjess BOUBAKRI, Jean-Claude COSSET and Omrane GUEDHAMI: Postprivatization Corporate 
Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection 
CLIM 38.2003  Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers 
KNOW 39.2003  Slim BEN YOUSSEF: Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade 
CTN 40.2003  Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations 
KNOW 41.2003  Sonia OREFFICE: Abortion and Female Power in the Household: Evidence from Labor Supply 
KNOW 42.2003  Timo GOESCHL and Timothy SWANSON: On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing 
Biotechnologies 
ETA 43.2003  Giorgio BUSETTI and Matteo MANERA: STAR-GARCH Models for Stock Market Interactions in the Pacific 
Basin Region, Japan and US  
CLIM 44.2003  Katrin MILLOCK and Céline NAUGES: The French Tax on Air Pollution: Some Preliminary Results on its 
Effectiveness 
PRIV 45.2003  Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Paolo PINOTTI: The Political Economy of Privatization 
SIEV 46.2003  Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Burn or Bury? A Social Cost Comparison of Final Waste 
Disposal Methods 
ETA 47.2003  Jens HORBACH: Employment and Innovations in the Environmental Sector: Determinants and Econometrical 
Results for Germany 
CLIM 48.2003  Lori SNYDER, Nolan MILLER and Robert STAVINS: The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology 
Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing 
CLIM 49.2003  Lori SNYDER, Robert STAVINS and Alexander F. WAGNER: Private Options to Use Public Goods. Exploiting 
Revealed Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits 
CTN 50.2003  László Á. KÓCZY and Luc LAUWERS (lxi): The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension 
 
CTN 51.2003  Matthew O. JACKSON (lxi):Allocation Rules for Network Games 
CTN 52.2003  Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH (lxi): Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
CTN 53.2003  Fernando VEGA-REDONDO (lxi): Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: a network approach 
CTN 54.2003  Matthew HAAG and Roger LAGUNOFF (lxi): On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 
CTN 55.2003  Taiji FURUSAWA and Hideo KONISHI (lxi): Free Trade Networks 
CTN 56.2003  Halis Murat YILDIZ (lxi): National Versus International Mergers and Trade Liberalization 
CTN 57.2003    Santiago RUBIO and Alistair ULPH (lxi): An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International 
Environmental Agreements 
KNOW 58.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Dino PINELLI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: ICT, Clusters and Regional Cohesion: A 
Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Research 
KNOW 59.2003    Giorgio BELLETTINI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: Special Interests and Technological Change 
ETA 60.2003  Ronnie SCHÖB: The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey 
CLIM 61.2003  Michael FINUS, Ekko van IERLAND and Robert DELLINK: Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel 
Formation Game 
GG 62.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of 
International Environmental Agreements 
SIEV 63.2003  Alberto PETRUCCI: Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy 
CLIM 64.2003  Joseph E. ALDY, Scott BARRETT and Robert N. STAVINS: Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate 
Policy Architectures 
SIEV 65.2003  Edi DEFRANCESCO: The Beginning of Organic Fish Farming in Italy 
SIEV 66.2003  Klaus CONRAD: Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers Care for the Environment 
SIEV 67.2003  Paulo A.L.D. NUNES, Luca ROSSETTO, Arianne DE BLAEIJ: Monetary Value Assessment of Clam Fishing 
Management Practices in the Venice Lagoon: Results from a Stated Choice Exercise 
CLIM 68.2003  ZhongXiang ZHANG: Open Trade with the U.S. Without Compromising Canada’s Ability to Comply with its 
Kyoto Target  
KNOW 69.2003  David FRANTZ (lix): Lorenzo Market between Diversity and Mutation 
KNOW 70.2003  Ercole SORI (lix): Mapping Diversity in Social History 
KNOW 71.2003  Ljiljana DERU SIMIC (lxii): What is Specific about Art/Cultural Projects? 
KNOW 72.2003  Natalya V. TARANOVA (lxii):The Role of the City in Fostering Intergroup Communication in a Multicultural 
Environment: Saint-Petersburg’s Case  
KNOW 73.2003  Kristine CRANE (lxii): The City as an Arena for the Expression of Multiple Identities in the Age of 
Globalisation and Migration 
KNOW 74.2003  Kazuma MATOBA (lxii): Glocal Dialogue- Transformation through Transcultural Communication 
KNOW 75.2003  Catarina REIS OLIVEIRA (lxii): Immigrants’ Entrepreneurial Opportunities: The Case of the Chinese in 
Portugal 
KNOW 76.2003  Sandra WALLMAN (lxii): The Diversity of Diversity - towards a typology of urban systems 
KNOW 77.2003  Richard PEARCE (lxii): A Biologist’s View of Individual Cultural Identity for the Study of Cities 
KNOW 78.2003  Vincent MERK (lxii): Communication Across Cultures: from Cultural Awareness to Reconciliation of the 
Dilemmas 
KNOW 79.2003  Giorgio BELLETTINI, Carlotta BERTI CERONI and Gianmarco I.P.OTTAVIANO: Child Labor and Resistance 
to Change  
ETA 80.2003  Michele MORETTO, Paolo M. PANTEGHINI and Carlo SCARPA: Investment Size and Firm’s Value under 
Profit Sharing Regulation IEM 81.2003  Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Oil and Product Dynamics in International 
Petroleum Markets 
CLIM 82.2003  Y. Hossein FARZIN and Jinhua ZHAO: Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against 
Environmental Regulation 
CLIM 83.2003  Giuseppe DI VITA: Is the Discount Rate Relevant in Explaining the Environmental Kuznets Curve? 
CLIM 84.2003  Reyer GERLAGH and Wietze LISE: Induced Technological Change Under Carbon Taxes 
NRM 85.2003  Rinaldo BRAU, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PIGLIARU: How Fast are the Tourism Countries Growing? 
The cross-country evidence 
KNOW 86.2003  Elena BELLINI, Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI: The ICT Revolution: opportunities and risks 
for the Mezzogiorno 
SIEV 87.2003  Lucas BRETSCGHER and Sjak SMULDERS: Sustainability and Substitution of Exhaustible Natural Resources. 
How resource prices affect long-term R&D investments 
CLIM 88.2003  Johan EYCKMANS and Michael FINUS: New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of 
Global Warming 
CLIM 89.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI: Economic Development and Environmental Protection 
CLIM 90.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI: Environment and Economic Growth: Is Technical Change the Key to Decoupling? 
CLIM 91.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI and Barbara BUCHNER: Climate Policy and Economic Growth in Developing Countries 
IEM 92.2003  A. MARKANDYA, A. GOLUB and E. STRUKOVA: The Influence of Climate Change Considerations on Energy 
Policy: The Case of Russia 
ETA 93.2003  Andrea BELTRATTI: Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium 
CTN 94.2003  Parkash CHANDER: The γ-Core and Coalition Formation  
IEM 95.2003  Matteo MANERA and Angelo MARZULLO: Modelling the Load Curve of Aggregate Electricity Consumption 
Using Principal Components 
IEM 96.2003  Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA, Margherita GRASSO and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Long-run Models of 
Oil Stock Prices 
CTN 97.2003  Steven J. BRAMS, Michael A.  JONES, and D. Marc KILGOUR: Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process 
Matters 
KNOW 98.2003  John CROWLEY, Marie-Cecile NAVES (lxiii): Anti-Racist Policies in France. From Ideological and Historical 
Schemes to Socio-Political Realities 
KNOW  99.2003  Richard THOMPSON FORD (lxiii): Cultural Rights and Civic Virtue  
KNOW 100.2003  Alaknanda PATEL (lxiii): Cultural Diversity and Conflict in Multicultural Cities 
KNOW 101.2003  David MAY (lxiii): The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood 
KNOW 102.2003  Sébastien ARCAND, Danielle JUTEAU, Sirma BILGE, and Francine LEMIRE (lxiii) : Municipal Reform on the 
Island of Montreal: Tensions Between Two Majority Groups in a Multicultural City 
CLIM 103.2003  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime 
CLIM 104.2003  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in 
International Climate Agreements 
CLIM 105.2003  Anil MARKANDYA and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy 
NRM 106.2003  Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Management Challenges for Multiple-Species Boreal Forests 
NRM 107.2003  Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Threshold Effects in Coral Reef  Fisheries 
SIEV 108.2003  Sara ANIYAR ( lxiv): Estimating the Value of Oil Capital in a Small Open Economy: The Venezuela’s Example 
SIEV 109.2003  Kenneth ARROW, Partha DASGUPTA and Karl-Göran MÄLER(lxiv): Evaluating Projects and Assessing 
Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies 
NRM 110.2003  Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Catarina ROSETA-PALMA(lxiv): Instabilities and Robust Control in  Fisheries  
NRM 111.2003  Charles PERRINGS and Brian WALKER (lxiv): Conservation and Optimal Use of Rangelands 
ETA 112.2003  Jack GOODY (lxiv): Globalisation, Population and Ecology 
CTN  113.2003  Carlo CARRARO, Carmen MARCHIORI and Sonia OREFFICE: Endogenous Minimum Participation in 
International Environmental Treaties 
CTN 114.2003  Guillaume HAERINGER and Myrna WOODERS: Decentralized Job Matching 
CTN 115.2003  Hideo KONISHI and M. Utku UNVER: Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems 
CTN 116.2003  Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for the Room-Mates Problem 
CTN 117.2003  Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for a Generalized Marriage Problem 
CTN 118.2003  Marita LAUKKANEN: Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty 
CTN  119.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary 
Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results 
CTN 120.2003  Gianluigi VERNASCA: Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation 
CTN 121.2003  Myrna WOODERS, Edward CARTWRIGHT and Reinhard SELTEN: Social Conformity in Games with Many 
Players 
CTN 122.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players
CTN 123.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many 
Players 
  1000  Carlo CARRARO, Alessandro LANZA and Valeria PAPPONETTI: One Thousand Working Papers  
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2004 
    
IEM 1.2004  Anil MARKANDYA, Suzette PEDROSO and Alexander GOLUB: 
 Empirical Analysis of National Income and 
So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries
 
ETA 2.2004  Masahisa FUJITA and Shlomo WEBER: Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries
PRA 3.2004  Adolfo DI CARLUCCIO, Giovanni FERRI, Cecilia FRALE and Ottavio RICCHI: Do Privatizations Boost 
Household Shareholding? Evidence from Italy 
ETA 4.2004  Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER: Languages Disenfranchisement in the European Union 
ETA 5.2004  Romano PIRAS: Growth, Congestion of Public Goods, and Second-Best Optimal Policy 
CCMP 6.2004  Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Lessons from the Polder: Is Dutch CO2-Taxation Optimal 
PRA 7.2004  Sandro BRUSCO, Giuseppe LOPOMO and S. VISWANATHAN (lxv): Merger Mechanisms 
PRA 8.2004  Wolfgang AUSSENEGG, Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding, and a 
When-Issued Market  
PRA 9.2004  Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets 
PRA 10.2004  Florian ENGLMAIER, Pablo GUILLEN, Loreto LLORENTE, Sander ONDERSTAL and Rupert SAUSGRUBER 
(lxv): The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions 
PRA 11.2004  Bjarne BRENDSTRUP and Harry J. PAARSCH (lxv): Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-
Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders 
PRA 12.2004  Ohad KADAN (lxv): Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values  
PRA 13.2004  Maarten C.W. JANSSEN (lxv): Auctions as Coordination Devices 
PRA 14.2004  Gadi FIBICH, Arieh GAVIOUS and Aner SELA (lxv): All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers 
PRA 15.2004  Orly SADE, Charles SCHNITZLEIN and Jaime F. ZENDER (lxv): Competition and Cooperation in Divisible 
Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination 
PRA 16.2004  Marta STRYSZOWSKA (lxv): Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions 
CCMP 17.2004  Slim Ben YOUSSEF: R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade 
NRM 18.2004  Angelo ANTOCI, Simone BORGHESI and Paolo RUSSU (lxvi): Biodiversity and Economic Growth: 
Stabilization Versus Preservation of the Ecological Dynamics 
SIEV 19.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Paolo ROSATO, Alberto LONGO  and Valentina ZANATTA: Information and Willingness to 
Pay in a Contingent Valuation Study: The Value of S. Erasmo in the Lagoon of Venice 
NRM 20.2004  Guido CANDELA and Roberto CELLINI (lxvii): Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of  
Differentiated Oligopoly 
NRM 21.2004  Jacqueline M. HAMILTON (lxvii): Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists 
NRM 22.2004  Javier Rey-MAQUIEIRA PALMER, Javier LOZANO IBÁÑEZ  and Carlos Mario GÓMEZ GÓMEZ (lxvii): 
Land, Environmental Externalities and Tourism Development 
NRM 23.2004  Pius ODUNGA and Henk FOLMER (lxvii): Profiling Tourists for Balanced Utilization of Tourism-Based 
Resources in Kenya 
NRM 24.2004  Jean-Jacques NOWAK, Mondher SAHLI and Pasquale M. SGRO (lxvii):Tourism, Trade and Domestic Welfare 
NRM 25.2004  Riaz SHAREEF (lxvii): Country Risk Ratings of Small Island Tourism Economies 
NRM 26.2004  Juan Luis Eugenio-MARTÍN, Noelia MARTÍN MORALES and Riccardo SCARPA (lxvii): Tourism and 
Economic Growth in Latin American Countries: A Panel Data Approach 
NRM 27.2004  Raúl Hernández MARTÍN (lxvii): Impact of Tourism Consumption on GDP. The Role of Imports  
CSRM 28.2004  Nicoletta FERRO: Cross-Country Ethical Dilemmas in Business: A Descriptive Framework  
NRM 29.2004  Marian WEBER (lxvi): Assessing the Effectiveness of Tradable Landuse Rights for Biodiversity Conservation: 
an Application to Canada's Boreal Mixedwood Forest 
NRM 30.2004  Trond BJORNDAL, Phoebe KOUNDOURI and Sean PASCOE (lxvi): Output Substitution in Multi-Species 
Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting 
CCMP 31.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA, Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part I: Sectoral Analysis of Climate Impacts in Italy  
CCMP 32.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA ,Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy  
CTN 33.2004  Wilson PEREZ: Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution 
KTHC 34.2004  Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxviii): The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence 
from US Cities 
KTHC 35.2004  Linda CHAIB (lxviii): Immigration and Local Urban Participatory Democracy: A Boston-Paris Comparison 
KTHC 36.2004  Franca ECKERT COEN and Claudio ROSSI  (lxviii): Foreigners, Immigrants, Host Cities: The Policies of 
Multi-Ethnicity in Rome. Reading Governance in a Local Context 
KTHC 37.2004  Kristine CRANE (lxviii): Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups’ Strategies in Three Italian Cities – Rome, 
Naples and Bari 
KTHC 38.2004  Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxviii): Mind in Africa, Body in Europe: The Struggle for Maintaining and Transforming 
Cultural Identity - A Note from the Experience of Eritrean Immigrants in Stockholm 
ETA 39.2004  Alberto CAVALIERE: Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly 
PRA 40.2004  Andrea BIGANO and Stef PROOST: The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: 
Does the Degree of Competition Matter? CCMP 41.2004  Michael FINUS (lxix): International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems 
  
 
(lix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 16-
17, 2002 
(lx) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-
28, 2002 
(lxi) This paper was presented at the Eighth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by 
the GREQAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, January 24-25, 2003    
(lxii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Communication across Cultures in 
Multicultural Cities”, The Hague, November 7-8, 2002 
(lxiii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Social dynamics and conflicts in 
multicultural cities”, Milan, March 20-21, 2003 
(lxiv) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Theoretical Topics in Ecological 
Economics”, organised by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics - ICTP, the 
Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei – FEEM 
Trieste, February 10-21, 2003 
(lxv) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and sponsored by the EU, 
Milan, September 25-27, 2003 
(lxvi) This paper has been presented at the 4th BioEcon Workshop on “Economic Analysis of 
Policies for Biodiversity Conservation” organised on behalf of the BIOECON Network by 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice International University (VIU) and University College London 
(UCL) , Venice, August 28-29, 2003 
(lxvii) This paper has been presented at the international conference on “Tourism and Sustainable 
Economic Development – Macro and Micro Economic Issues” jointly organised by CRENoS 
(Università di Cagliari e Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and supported by the 
World Bank, Sardinia, September 19-20, 2003 
(lxviii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Governance and Policies in 
Multicultural Cities”, Rome, June 5-6, 2003 
(lxix) This paper was presented at  the Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference “The 




  2003 SERIES 
  CLIM  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KNOW  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRIV  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 




  2004 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRA  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 